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<A> Historical Background 
 
Chess has long served as a model task environment (Drosophila -- fruit fly) for 
research into psychological processes (Charness, 1992).  Some of the earliest 
systematic work on individual differences in imagery (Binet, 1893/1966; 1894), 
memory (Djakow, Petrowski, & Rudik, 1927) and problem solving (de Groot 
1946/1965) took place in the domain of chess.  Cleveland (1907) was one of the first 
to identify the importance of complex units, now called chunks, in skilled play, and 
speculated that intellectual abilities might be poor predictors of chess skill, even 
providing the score of a game played with a "mentally feeble" individual. 
De Groot ushered in the modern era of investigation (1946/1965) using small 
groups of expert and grandmaster level players in experimental studies.  Of de Groot's 
many findings, it was the dissociation between thinking skills and perceptual-memory 
skills that laid the groundwork for subsequent research.  When asking players to think 
aloud while they attempted to choose the best move in an unfamiliar position, de 
Groot discovered that, contrary to popular lore, the most proficient players did not 
28/12/2007  2 out of 36 
think further ahead than less skilled practitioners.  It was a different experimental task 
-- memory for briefly presented chess positions -- that markedly differentiated skill 
levels.  De Groot found that skilled players proved to have strikingly superior memory 
for chess positions after brief presentations (2-15 s), compared to their less proficient 
counterparts.  De Groot interpreted these findings to support the importance of 
knowledge and perceptual organization principles over search algorithm differences 
in explaining how experts chose better moves.   
Follow-up research by Chase and Simon (1973a, 1973b) revealed that the 
perceptual/memory advantage for skilled players was only obtained when they viewed 
structured chess positions.  When pieces were randomly arranged on the board, there 
was little, if any, memory advantage for a Master player compared to a Class A 
player, compared to a novice player.  This dissociation, a finding that has become a 
touchstone of the expert performance approach in many other domains, suggested that 
acquired patterns not innate abilities accounted for skill differences.  On the basis of 
these data and those gathered in other experiments and in simulation studies, Chase 
and Simon proposed their highly influential chunking theory of skilled performance in 
chess.  That theory and its subsequent refinement has had a significant impact on 
expertise research in general and that on games in particular (see Gobet, de Voogt, & 
Retschitzki, 2004, for an extensive coverage on board games, and Charness, 1989, for 
a presentation of the data on bridge.). 
 
<A>Brief Description of the Game and the Rating System 
 
Chess is a game played by two opponents using an initial configuration, the 
starting position, consisting of 32 chess pieces placed on an 8x8 square chessboard.  
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The rules of chess are sufficiently simple that children can be taught them at a very 
young age (4 or 5 years old).  Child prodigies are not uncommon and teenagers have 
been able to compete at the highest level. (Nineteen year-old Ruslan Ponomariov was 
crowned world champion in 2002.)  Chess is sufficiently difficult to play well that it 
took about 40 years of effort by computer scientists to program computers to compete 
on an equal level with the best human players.  
Another important feature for chess is the existence of a sophisticated 
measurement scale for evaluating chess skill based on performance in chess 
tournaments. The Elo rating scale, available since the mid 1960s (Elo, 1965; Elo, 
1986) is open-ended, starting at a nominal value of zero and extending upward, with a 
nominal class interval (standard deviation), of about 200 rating points.  The world’s 
best players today hover above 2800 rating points with Grandmaster level at 
approximately 2500 rating points, International Master at about 2400 points and 
Master at about 2200 points.  This interval level rating scale enables fine-grained 
examination of the relation between expertise and a variety of indicators of 
psychological processes.   Measurement of expertise on this fine a scale remains a 
central problem for many other domains discussed in this volume. 
For instance, a psychometric approach to chess skill (e.g., Van der Maas & 
Wagenmakers, 2005) can capitalize on the chess rating scale to examine how well it 
correlates with different markers of psychological processes such as measures of 
memory, problem solving, and motivation.  Early efforts at understanding skill in 
chess implicitly made use of this correlates approach for measures of attention 
(Tikhomirov & Poznyanskaya, 1966), imagery (Milojkovic, 1982; Bachmann & Oit, 
1992) and personality (Charness, Tuffiash & Jastrzembski, 2004).   
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In this chapter we focus on a process model approach to understanding 
expertise in chess.  Our goal is to shed light on the process of how players choose the 
best moves to play in a chess game, starting from early perceptual processes and 
tracing forward to the search processes first described by de Groot.  We outline where 
skill differences arise within such processes.  We describe computer simulation 
models that capture some of the features of skilled performance by chess players.  We 
also describe how human players acquire the knowledge necessary to play chess 
expertly.   
 
<A>Information Processing Models of Choosing a Good Move: The Trade-Offs 
Between Knowledge And Search 
 
The goal of a chess player is to choose the best possible move.  Often, when playing 
through standard openings, the best move is dictated by knowledge from published 
analyses, such as the Encyclopedia of Chess Openings.  Sometimes, detecting the best 
move in a sequence of exchanges of pieces is simple enough that even novices 
quickly find it.  Much of the time, the best move is non-obvious and the player must 
decide based on a search process that evaluates a candidate move in terms of potential 
future positions reached via a branching tree of available moves for the two sides.   
 
Search is difficult because of the enormous number of possible moves stemming from 
the opening position.  Even master players who can use well-tuned recognition 
processes to winnow the possible base moves down to 3 or 4 plausible alternatives at 
each point in the tree face a dilemma.  The number of possible moves, computed as 
breadth raised to a power equal to depth, is 476 moves, given that the average master 
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game lasts about 38 moves or 76 plies (moves for each side).  So, both computers and 
humans must search selectively among the alternatives using a variety of heuristics 
(Newell & Simon, 1972) to decide when a node reached in search can be properly 
evaluated.   
 
Given the relatively slow rate at which moderately skilled players can generate 
analysis moves, estimated in Charness (1981b) to be about 4 moves per minute, it is 
obvious that much of the time that human players spend is not in generating all 
possible moves (perhaps taking a move per second) but in generating moves 
selectively and using complex evaluation functions to assess their value.  Computer 
chess programs can achieve high-level play by searching many moves using fast, 
frugal evaluation processes that involve minimal chess knowledge to evaluate the 
terminal positions in search.  Deep Blue, the chess program that defeated World 
Champion Garry Kasparov in a short match in 1997, searched hundreds of millions of 
positions per second.  Today’s leading microcomputer chess programs that have 
drawn matches with the best human players, have sophisticated search algorithms and 
attempt to use more chess knowledge but still generate hundreds of thousands or 
millions of chess moves per second.  Generally, chess programs rely on search more 
heavily than knowledge; for humans it is the reverse.  Yet, each can achieve very high 
performance levels because knowledge and search can trade off (Berliner & Ebeling, 
1989). 
 
Because expert humans do so little search, yet still manage to find strong chess 
moves, attention has shifted from investigating search processes to understanding the 
role of pattern recognition processes in move selection.  As de Groot noted, skilled 
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players use their knowledge about chess configurations to generate plausible moves 
for limited searching.  We now focus on understanding the perceptual mechanisms 
that support this rapid perception advantage. 
 
<B>Tracing Expertise Differences in Perception and Attention with Eye-Tracking 
Techniques 
 
Jongman (1968) initiated work on perceptual skill differences by examining eye 
movements of expert and less expert players, though his results became widely 
accessible with the re-analysis published by de Groot and Gobet (1996).  These 
researchers showed that in a memorizing task, where players were given a few 
seconds to examine an unfamiliar chess position, better players fixated more on the 
edges of squares than weaker players did.  Also, better players were more likely to 
have greater distances between fixations, implying that they were able to encode more 
widely about a fixation than weaker players.  Experts also made shorter duration 
fixations than did weaker players implying faster encoding. 
 
Reingold and colleagues confirmed the larger visual span for experts using a variety 
of tasks.  Using a gaze-contingent paradigm that manipulated the number of visible 
squares, Reingold, Charness, Pomplun, and Stampe (2001) showed that more skilled 
players needed a larger area around fixation to detect changes in successively 
displayed chess positions in order to match performance under unlimited view of the 
whole board.  This was only true for structured, not random chess positions.  This 
result suggested that better players had a larger visual field from which they could 
extract chess relationships.  In a second experiment, the authors noted that when 
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players made a simple determination of whether a King was in check by an attacking 
piece on a minimized chessboard (3 x 3 squares), experts required fewer fixations to 
decide and these fixations were more likely to be between pieces (on empty squares), 
compared to intermediate-level players. (See also Fisk & Lloyd, 1988, and 
Saariluoma, 1985, for data on perceptual processes in simple decision tasks.)  
 
In a choose-a-move task using full chessboards, Charness, Reingold, Pomplun and 
Stampe (2001) demonstrated that experts made fewer fixations per trial and those 
fixations were more widely spaced out across the board and again, more likely to be 
between than on chess pieces.  More importantly, for the first five fixations, experts 
were more likely to fixate on relevant squares (rated as relevant by a strong 
International Master player).  This very early advantage (within the first second of 
exposure to a new position, given that fixations average about 250 ms each for both 
experts and intermediate players) testifies to the importance of pattern recognition 
processes in providing a better representational structure.  Given this perceptual head 
start, experts also chose better moves and did so more quickly than their less expert 
counterparts. 
 
Reingold, Charness, Schultetus and Stampe (2001) used a Stroop-like interference 
task within a 5 x 5 square segment of a chessboard to demonstrate that expert players 
appear to extract chess relations in parallel whereas weaker ones appear to shift 
attention and encode the same relations serially.  In a two-attacker situation, supplying 
a cue about which piece to attend to provided an advantage in response time to less 
skilled players, but no advantage to expert players because the latter appeared to 
encode both attack relations simultaneously.  
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In summary, experts rely on a rich network of chess patterns stored in long-term 
memory structures (or long-term working memory, Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995) to give 
them a larger visual span when encoding chess positions.  They encode chess 
information far more quickly and accurately than non-experts.  Within the first second 
of exposure to a new position, experts are examining salient squares on the 
chessboard and extracting, in parallel, chess relationships critical to choosing good 
moves.  In later sections we outline how CHREST, a computer simulation program, 
acquires and utilizes such chess patterns (templates and chunks).   
 
<B>Memory Processes  
As early as Binet (1894), and in particular in de Groot’s work, knowledge has been 
identified as a key component of chess expertise. In order to understand how 
knowledge (held in memory) mediates skill, a substantial amount of research has been 
carried out on chess players’ memory. Domains of interest include memory for static 
positions, memory for moves and sequences of moves [discussed in the section on 
blindfold chess], and the structure and contents of long-term memory (LTM), 
including the number of chunks necessary to reach expert performance. In many 
cases, experimentation has been carried out in concert with computational modeling. 
 
<C>Memory recall for positions: Chase and Simon’s key results. While both Binet 
and De Groot highlighted the key role of knowledge in chess expertise, one had to 
wait until Chase and Simon’s work in 1973 to have a detailed theory of expert 
memory. Extending De Groot’s study showing a striking skill effect in the recall of 
game positions, Chase and Simon carried out detailed analyses to identify what were 
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the building blocks of chess knowledge. In a copy task, they analysed the pattern of 
eye fixations on the stimulus board, as well as the way pieces were grouped during 
reconstruction.  Comparing these results with those obtained in a recall task, they 
inferred that pieces placed within 2 seconds and sharing a number of semantic 
relations were likely to belong to the same chunk. (These results were replicated by 
Gobet & Simon, 1998, and Gobet & Clarkson, 2004.) They proposed that skill did not 
reside in differences in short-term memory (STM) capacity or encoding speed, but in 
the number of chunks held in LTM memory. These chunks give access to information 
such as what move to play, what plan to follow, and what evaluation to give to (part 
of) the position. Thus, their theory explained both why masters choose better moves 
in spite of their selective search (because chunks enable them to identify the key 
features of a position, and guide search during look-ahead) and why they perform 
better in a memory task (because they can partition the position in relatively large 
groups of pieces, unlike weaker players who have to use more smaller groups, which 
overtax STM). Some of these ideas were implemented in a computer program, MAPP 
(Simon & Gilmartin, 1973), which simulated recall up to expert level. 
 
<C>Problems with the chunking theory lead to the template theory.  A number of 
experiments have helped refined Chase and Simon’s theory. Charness (1976) showed 
that the presence of an interfering task reduced recall only marginally, which runs 
counter the assumption of a slow encoding in LTM. Several authors (Frey & 
Adesman, 1976; Cooke et al., 1994; Gobet & Simon, 1996a) have shown that players 
can remember multiple boards reasonably well, which again highlighted a weakness 
of the original chunking theory.  
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These results, as well as the fact that verbal protocols reveal that masters use larger 
structures than the chunks identified by Chase and Simon (e.g., De Groot, 1946; De 
Groot & Gobet, 1996; Freyhoff, Gruber, & Ziegler, 1992; Gobet, 1998a), led Gobet 
and Simon (1996a, 2000) to revise the chunking theory.  Their template theory aimed 
to remedy these weaknesses, while keeping the strengths of the original chunking 
theory. It also aimed to show how high-level, schematic structures (templates) can 
evolve from perceptual chunks. As with the chunking theory, chunks and now 
templates are crucial in explaining how players access relevant information by pattern 
recognition. The computer program CHREST (Chunk Hierarchy and REtrieval 
STructures) implements aspects of the template theory. CHREST consists of an STM, 
an LTM indexed by a discrimination net, and a simulated eye. Each cognitive process 
has a time cost; for example, it takes 50 ms to place a chunk in STM, and 8 seconds to 
create a new chunk. During the learning phase, the program automatically acquires 
chunks and templates by scanning a database of positions taken from masters’ games. 
During the testing phase, it is placed in the same experimental situation as human 
participants. The program has simulated various characteristics of players’ eye 
movements (De Groot & Gobet, 1996), the details of reconstruction in recall 
experiments (Gobet, 1993; Gobet & Simon, 2000; Gobet & Waters, 2003), as well as 
the way novices learn to memorize chess positions (Gobet & Jackson, 2002). Beyond 
chess, variants of the program have been applied to memory for computer programs, 
use of diagrammatic representation in physics, concept formation, and children’s 
acquisition of language (Gobet et al., 2001). 
 
<C>Random positions. While Chase and Simon (1973a, b) found no skill difference 
in the recall of random positions, Gobet and Simon (1996b) show that later studies did 
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in fact find such a difference, although the effect is rarely significant due to the low 
statistical power within these studies. This skill effect remains across a wide range of 
presentation times (from 1 second to 60 seconds; Gobet & Simon, 2000) and with 
positions where the location as well as the distribution of pieces is randomized (Gobet 
& Waters, 2003). These results are consistent with the chunking and template 
theories, which predict that strong players, who have more chunks, are more likely 
than weaker players to recognize some patterns even with random positions. Indeed, 
computer simulations (Gobet & Simon, 1996b; Gobet & Simon, 2000) confirmed 
these predictions. 
 
<C>New estimates of the vocabulary of the master.  Based upon computer 
simulations with MAPP, Simon and Gilmartin (1973) estimated that one needed to 
acquire from 10,000 to 100,000 patterns to reach master level in chess. These 
estimates have led to several experiments, in part because Holding (1985) argued that 
a much smaller number was required if one assumed that the same chunk could 
encode the same constellation of pieces placed at different locations of the board. 
Saariluoma (1994) modified positions by swapping quadrants, and Gobet and Simon 
(1996c) modified positions by taking their mirror images along various axes of 
symmetry. Both found that these manipulations affected recall, which runs counter to 
Holding’s predictions but supports the original chunking theory. Computer 
simulations with CHREST show that at least 300,000 chunks are required to reach 
grandmaster level, even with the presence of templates, which were not part of the 
chunking theory.  
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<C>Recognition experiments.  In the past, few studies have been carried out using a 
recognition paradigm (e.g., Goldin, 1978, 1979; Saariluoma, 1984). This pattern has 
not changed in recent years, and we could find only one study using this technique. 
McGregor and Howes (2002) presented positions for either 9 or 30 s, asked 
participants to evaluate them, and later carried out a recognition test. In one 
experiment, the positions presented during the recognition phase were distorted by 
shifting either all pieces or a single piece one square horizontally. Two further 
experiments used a priming technique during the recognition phase: a piece from the 
target position was shown for two seconds; this was followed by a second piece, and 
participants indicated whether they thought it was in the target position. The two 
pieces shared either a relation of attack/defence or a relation of proximity. McGregor 
and Howes found that class A players used information about attack/defence more 
often that information about the location of pieces. 
 
<B>Problem Solving Processes.  
 
Today’s chess-playing programs benefit from the enormous progress in refining 
computer search algorithms.  Running on off-the-shelf microcomputers, they are of 
world championship caliber.  One could argue that knowledge about human problem 
solving processes in chess has lagged the efforts in artificial intelligence, though 
steady progress is evident.  De Groot (1946/1965), Newell and Simon (1972) and 
Wagner and Scurrah (1971) have generated many of the explicit models that describe 
the heuristics used by humans to manage search. 
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<C>De Groot’s study.  De Groot (1946) asked his participants to think aloud when 
choosing their next move in a problem position. The quantitative and qualitative 
measures he extracted from the verbal protocols provided important empirical 
information about chessplayers’ thinking.  We will use some of the main phenomena 
discussed by de Groot to organize this section.  
 
<C>Macrostructure of Search in Chess.  De Groot (1946) found few differences in 
the macrostructure of search between world-class grandmasters and relatively strong 
players (Experts). Surprisingly, during their search, players from both skill levels 
tended to search at similar depth, to consider the same number of positions, and to 
propose similar numbers of candidate moves. But there were differences as well: the 
grandmasters chose better moves than the Experts, they generated moves faster, they 
reached a decision faster, and, during their search, they examined moves and 
sequences of moves that tended to be more relevant. 
 
Holding (1985) argued that de Groot’s (1946) small sample (5 grandmasters and 5 
Experts) may have concealed existing skill differences. Supporting Holding’s view, 
some skill differences were found with samples including weaker players (e.g., 
Charness, 1981b; Gobet, 1998b; Saariluoma, 1992). Charness (1981a) suggested that 
depth of search increases up to Expert level, after which it stays uniform.  Charness 
(1989) conducted a 9-year longitudinal investigation of a Canadian player who 
advanced (in power law fashion) from an average level performance (1600 rating 
points) to International master level performance (2300 rating points) and found no 
significant increase in depth of search.  However, international masters and 
grandmasters sometimes carry out shallower search than masters (Saariluoma, 1990a), 
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perhaps indicating that they can tailor their search mechanisms to the demands of the 
position.  Gobet (1997a) carried out computer simulations with the SEARCH model 
(see below) and concluded that average depth of search keeps increasing with higher 
skill levels, but with diminishing returns (i.e., it follows a power law).  
 
<C>. Selective Search, Move Generation, and Pattern Recognition.  De Groot found 
that all players were highly selective in their search, rarely visiting more than one 
hundred nodes before choosing a move. Recent results support this view. Calderwood 
et al. (1988) showed that masters can make relatively good decisions even under time 
pressure (about 5 s per move). Gobet and Simon (1996d) found that world champion 
Kasparov, when playing simultaneous games against teams consisting of up to eight 
international masters and grandmasters, performed at a level that still placed him in 
about the six best players in the world. Gobet and Simon argued that, while 
Kasparov’s performance was weaker than in normal games and showed more 
variability, it was higher than theories mainly based on search would predict (but see 
Lassiter, 2000, and Chabris & Hearst, 2003 for opposing views). Comparing the 
quality of play of world-class grandmasters in standard games (about 3 minutes per 
move, on average) and rapid games (less than 30 seconds per move, on average), 
Chabris and Hearst (2003) found that this decrease of thinking time by a factor of six 
only marginally affected the number of blunders per 1,000 moves (5.02 in classical 
games vs. 6.85 in rapid games). While they took this as evidence for the role of 
search, a more natural interpretation of these results is that they show that a 
substantial decrease in thinking time fails to increase the number of blunders 
substantially, which counts as direct support for theories emphasising pattern 
recognition. 
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Proponents of search models often cite Holding and Reynolds’ (1982) experiment as 
evidence that search and pattern recognition can be dissociated. Holding and 
Reynolds, who used semi-random positions as stimuli, first asked players to recall the 
position after an eight-second presentation, and then to choose what they thought 
would be the move. They found that skill correlated with the quality of chosen move 
after a few minutes’ deliberation, but not with the recall or the evaluation after brief 
presentation. Schultetus and Charness (1999) extended Holding and Reynolds’ (1982) 
experiment with a crucial addition: they asked players to recall the position at the end 
of problem solving. Like in the original study, stronger player did not recall the 
position better after 5 seconds, but chose better moves. However, they also obtained 
better results in the recall performance following problem solving. Schultetus and 
Charness (1999) argue that these results are consistent with the hypothesis that pattern 
recognition underpins skill in chess.  That is, in order to choose better moves, better 
players were able to form new relational patterns for the unusual piece placements. 
These new chunks provided the recall advantage after problem solving.  Such results 
are also consistent with the Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) long-term working memory 
perspective. 
 
<C> Progressive Deepening.  De Groot (1946) found that players were visiting the 
same branches of the search tree repeatedly, either directly or after visiting other 
branches. According to de Groot, this phenomenon of ”progressive deepening” occurs 
both in order to compensate for limitations in memory and for propagating 
information from one branch of the search tree to another (De Groot, 1946; De Groot 
& Gobet, 1996). Gobet (1998b) found that skill affects how progressive deepening is 
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carried out. The maximum number of immediate re-investigations (where the same 
base move is analyzed directly in the next episode) was proportional to players’ 
strength, while the maximum number of non-immediate re-investigations (where the 
analysis of a base move and its reinvestigation is interrupted by the analysis at least 
one different move) was inversely proportional to players’ strength.  
 
<C> High-Level Knowledge and Planning. De Groot (1946), who emphasized the 
role of conceptual knowledge in chess expertise, reported that players’ descriptions of 
games were centred on key positions; this finding has been confirmed by recent 
research (e.g., Cooke et al., 1993; De Groot & Gobet, 1996; Saariluoma, 1995). The 
presence of these key positions enables masters to acquire what de Groot called a 
“system of playing methods”, many of which are stereotypical. By applying this 
routine knowledge, masters can often find good moves with minimal look-ahead. 
Saariluoma (1990a, 1992) tested this hypothesis with tactical positions, and found that 
strong players tended to choose stereotyped solutions and missed shorter (but non-
typical) solutions.  
 
Saariluoma and Hohlfeld (1994) were interested in planning with strategic positions. 
They found that null moves (missing moves for one side) were common (about 12 per 
cent of all moves). This result is similar to the 10 per cent found in a previous study 
by Charness (1981a). In a second experiment, Saariluoma and Hohlfeld (1994) 
changed the nature of positions by relocating a key piece, so that a combination 
possible before the transformation could not be carried out after. Eliminating the 
combination produced an increase of the number of null moves.  
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<C> Computational models of problem solving.  Simon and his colleagues developed 
a number of process models of problem solving in chess (Baylor & Simon, 1966; 
Newell & Simon, 1972), and two production systems at the boundary between 
cognitive science and artificial intelligence were written by Wilkins (1980) and Pitrat 
(1977). Gobet and Jansen (1994) describe a program that uses pure pattern 
recognition to select moves, without carrying out any search. This is presented more 
as a first step toward a full problem-solving program than as a theory of human 
problem solving. Gobet (1997a) describes SEARCH, a probabilistic model that 
integrates pattern recognition and search. This model, which is a direct 
implementation of the template theory and which incorporates insights from previous 
theories (e.g., De Groot, 1946; Newell & Simon, 1972), does not play chess but 
computes several measures such as depth of search, rate of search, and the level of 
fuzziness in the mind’s eye as a function of the skill level (i.e., number of chunks). 
 
When generating moves from the stimulus position or later during look ahead, the 
model uses either fast pattern recognition (chunks and templates) or slower heuristics. 
The same methods are used when the model evaluates positions at the end of a 
sequence of moves. The generation of an episode (sequence of moves) is stopped 
when the level of fuzziness in the mind’s eye is too high, an evaluation has been 
proposed, or no move or sequence of moves has been proposed. It is assumed that 
information in the mind’s eye decays at a constant rate, which interferes with search. 
Finally, the model has a time cost for every cognitive operation; for example, it takes 
2 s to carry out a move in the mind’s eye, and 10 s to evaluate a position using 
heuristics. 
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The program predicts that depth of search follows a power law of skill. When 
simulating a small number of participants (as is typical in chess research), the 
program also shows substantial variability, as was found in Saariluoma’s (1992) 
study, where international masters and grandmasters searched less than weaker 
masters.  
 
<B> Blindfold Chess. 
 
A number of studies have investigated blindfold chess, to which Binet (1894) had 
already devoted a lengthy study. In blindfold chess, a player carries out one or several 
games without the view of the board and the pieces; the moves are communicated 
through standard chess notation. 
 
Ericsson and Oliver (1984; cited in Ericsson & Staszewski, 1989) investigated the 
nature of the representation for chess positions dictated move by move with a player 
of near master strength.  In a set of experiments they demonstrated that the retrieval 
structure utilized by the player was extremely flexible, permitting very fast responses 
about what piece was present (or if the square was unoccupied) to probes (square 
names in algebraic notation) of each square on the chessboard.  In some cases the 
response time of about 2 s was faster than that obtained when the player looked at a 
chessboard position and was probed with the name of a square.  They also found that 
when the player memorized two chess positions, responses to probes of the squares 
of the chessboard improved with successive tests from the same board at a much 
faster rate than in conditions where there were random probes or when probes 
alternated across boards.  In further experiments they demonstrated that the 
28/12/2007  19 out of 36 
representation structure was different for memory retrieval versus perceptually 
available retrieval conditions.  Such flexibility in the encoded representation is 
necessary for being able to choose good moves when playing blindfolded. (See 
Gobet, 1998a, for a further discussion of these results.) 
 
Saariluoma (1991) studied memory for move sequences using blindfold chess. He 
dictated one move every 2 s, from three types of sequences: moves actually played in 
a game, random but legal moves, and random and possibly illegal moves. He found 
that masters could recall almost perfectly the position for the moves taken from actual 
games and legal random moves after 15 moves, but performed poorly with illegal 
random moves. With additional moves, the recall of legal random moves decreased 
much faster than that of game moves. Saariluoma proposed that legal random moves 
initially allow for a relatively good recall because they only slowly produce positions 
where it is not possible to recognize chunks. These results are in line with Chase and 
Simon’s (1973b), who studied memory for moves with plain view of the board.   
 
In a series of experiments, Saariluoma (1991) and Saariluoma and Kalakoski (1997) 
systematically investigated memory for blindfold games. They presented one or 
several games aurally (dictating moves using the standard algebraic chess notation) or 
visually (presenting only the current move on a computer screen). Only a few of their 
results can be presented here: blindfold chess requires mainly visuo-spatial working 
memory, and makes little use of verbal working memory; differences in LTM 
knowledge (e.g., number of chunks) rather than differences in imagery ability 
underpin skill differences; abstract representations are essential (cf. also Binet’s, 
1894); and there is no difference between auditory and a visual presentation. 
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Campitelli and Gobet (2005) used blindfold chess to study how perception filters out 
relevant from irrelevant information. They found that irrelevant information affects 
chess masters only when it changes during the presentation of the target game. 
  
Problem solving has also been studied using blindfold chess (Saariluoma & 
Kalakoski, 1998). In a task consisting in searching for the best move, they found that 
players memorized pieces better when these were functionally relevant. This 
difference disappeared in a task where players had to count the number of pieces. 
They also found that tactical combinations embedded in a game position were easier 
to solve than those contained in a random position. As with normal chess, visuo-
spatial interfering tasks negatively affect problem solving performance. Finally, 
Chabris and Hearst (2003) found that the number of blunders did not increase much 
when grandmasters played blindfold games as compared to games with the view of 
the pieces. 
 
Campitelli and Gobet (2005) argue that most of the results found on blindfold chess 
can be explained by the template theory. 
 
<A> Building a Human Master 
 
<B>Prodigies: Born or Made, and the Issue of Critical Periods. 
 
In the last decade, psychology has seen renewed interest in the question of the roles of 
talent and practice, and the psychology of expertise is no exception. This section 
contains a brief review of topics related to this question that can be roughly classified 
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in three headings: development, training and education, and neuroscience. A fair 
conclusion from the available evidence is that we do still not have data rich enough to 
determine how they might interact in the development of chess expertise. 
 
<C> Developmental Issues. In a classic study on the role of knowledge on memory 
development, Chi (1978) found that, while non-chessplaying adults were better at 
memorizing digits than chess-playing children, they were worse at memorizing game 
positions. Thus, domain-specific knowledge can override developmental differences. 
Schneider et al. (1993) extended Chi’s study by adding child novices and adult 
experts to the design; they also presented random positions and added a non-chess 
visuo-spatial control task. Adults and children offered the same pattern of results: 
experts’ superiority was the largest with meaningful positions, was reduced with the 
random positions, and all but disappeared with the board control task (while absent in 
the first trial, skill effects were apparent in later trials).  
 
<C> Learning.  Several longitudinal studies have trained novices to memorize chess 
positions (Ericsson & Harris, 1990; Saariluoma & Laine, 2001; Gobet and Jackson, 
2002). Typically, learning follows a power function. Computer models based on 
chunking could simulate the data relatively well (Saariluoma & Laine, 2001; Gobet & 
Jackson, 2002). A power function of learning was also found in Fisk and Lloyd 
(1988), who studied how novices learn the movement of pieces in a pseudo-chess 
environment. 
 
Didierjean, Cauzinille-Marmèche and Savina (1999) were interested in how chess 
novices use reasoning by analogy in learning to solve chess combinations (smothered 
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mates). The results show that transfer was limited to problems perceptually similar to 
the examples and did not extend to problems requiring the use of the abstract principle 
behind the solution of these problems. 
 
<C> Training and Education.  Given the importance of deliberate practice in an 
entrepreneurial domain such as chess, one could expect that powerful training 
methods have been developed. There is not much about this topic in the literature, 
however. Gobet and Jansen (in press) show how educational principles that can be 
used in chess training can be derived from the template theory. The necessity of 
having a coach is debated in the literature; for example, Charness, Krampe and Mayr 
(1996) found a bivariate but not a unique multivariate correlation between chess skill 
and the presence of a coach in one sample; however, Charness, Tuffiash, Krampe, 
Reingold and Vasyukova (2005) did find it in another.  Gobet, Campitelli and Waters 
(2002) note that using computer databases and playing computers may provide more 
efficient training tools than traditional training practice based on books, which is 
consistent with the progressive replacement of the latter by the former in professional 
practice. This change in training practice techniques may well explain Howard’s 
(1999) observation that the number of young players among the world’s elite has 
increased in the last decades, which he takes as evidence that average human 
intelligence is rising overall.  Another explanation is that as young player populations 
increase, the best-trained individuals should reach higher levels of performance 
(Charness & Gerchak, 1996). 
 
Do skills acquired in playing chess transfer to other domains? Gobet and Campitelli 
(in press) reviewed all the available publications. Most studies did not meet criteria of 
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robust scientific research, but two well-controlled studies (Frank & d’Hondt, 1979; 
Christiaen & Verhofstadt-Denève, 1981) found that a chess-playing group 
outperformed a control group in verbal ability and school results, respectively. A limit 
of these 2 studies is that a large number of tests was used, which raises the possibility 
of type I errors. 
 
<C> Individual Differences.  Data about individual differences do not offer a clear 
pattern. There is evidence that chess skill correlates with measures of intelligence, 
both in children (Frank & d’Hondt, 1979; Frydman & Lynn, 1992; Horgan & Morgan, 
1990) and adults (Doll & Mayr, 1987). However, while Frank and d’Hondt (1979) 
and Schneider, Gruber, Gold and Opwis (1993) found that chess experts perform 
better than control in non-chess visuo-spatial tasks with children and teenagers, 
Djakow, Petrowski, and Rudik (1927), Doll and Mayr (1987) and Waters, Gobet and 
Leyden (2002) failed to find such differences with adults. Note that all the above 
studies, with the exception of Frank and d’Hondt (1979) who had an experimental 
design, used quasi-experimental designs; therefore, the results are based on 
correlations, which are equivocal about the direction of causality (is intelligence a 
prerequisite to chess skill, or does chess playing improves one’s intelligence?).  The 
differing patterns between children and adults are consistent with developmental 
theories that propose differentiation of abilities across time.  Early in development all 
forms of problem solving are dependent on fluid intelligence (search) but later, 
crystallized intelligence (knowledge: templates and chunks) changes the way that 
problem solving is carried out.   
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<C> Neuroscience.  Based on the responses to a questionnaire sent to players rated in 
the US Chess Federation ranking list, Cranberg and Albert (1988) found that 18% of 
male chess players were not right-handers. This percentage is reliably higher than that 
in the general population (~11%).  
 
Chabris and Hamilton (1992) carried out a divided visual-field experiment with male 
chess players, and found that the right hemisphere was better than the left at parsing 
patterns according to the default rules of chess chunking, but that the left hemisphere 
was more efficient at grouping pieces together when these rules did not apply. 
 
Several brain-imaging techniques have been employed to study chess skill (Atherton 
et al., 2003; Campitelli, 2003; Nichelli et al.; 1994; Onofrj et al., 1995; Amidzic et al., 
2001). Overall, these studies suggest that frontal and posterior parietal areas, among 
other areas, are engaged in chess playing. These areas are known to be engaged in 
tasks requiring working-memory processes. There is also some evidence that chunks 
are encoded in temporal lobe areas, including the fusiform gyrus, parahippocampal 
gyrus and inferior temporal gyrus. In a different line of research, Campitelli (2003) 
found that the left supramarginal gyrus and left frontal areas were involved in 
autobiographical memory in two chess masters. 
 
<B> The Role of Deliberate Practice and Tournament Experience. 
 
As appears to be true in other domains (see other chapters in this volume) skill 
acquisition in chess requires a considerable investment.  Few players reach master 
level performance with less than 1000 hours of serious study (Charness, Krampe & 
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Mayr, 1996).  Relying on responses to retrospective questionnaires, these 
investigators probed a large sample of tournament players from different countries 
focusing on how much time they spent in serious study alone (deliberate practice) 
versus that spent in tournament play and analysis of games with others.  Other 
predictors for current skill level included variables such as current age, starting age, 
age when serious about chess, age when joining a chess club, presence of coaching, 
and size of chess library.  The variables making independent contributions to 
explaining current chess rating were serious study alone, size of chess library, and 
current age.  Tournament play was not statistically significant after taking deliberate 
practice time into account.   
 
Not surprisingly, age was a negative predictor (older players tended to have lower 
ratings, averaging a loss of about 5-6 rating points per year), whereas deliberate 
practice and size of chess library were strong positive predictors, accounting in 
combination for nearly 70 percent of explained variance in current rating.  
 
In an enlarged version of the first sample and in a new sample, Charness, Tuffiash, 
Krampe, Reingold and Vasyukova (2005) showed a somewhat different pattern of 
relationships, with both coaching and tournament play in addition to deliberate 
practice making independent predictions to current chess rating.  For predicting a 
player’s peak rating, the two practice variables accounted for most of the variance.  Of 
course, this correlates approach suffers from the weakness that causality is not 
identifiable.  Longitudinal research is needed to trace out how process variables 
covary with changes in rating. 
 




The combination of empirical and theoretical work has identified and successfully 
characterized a rich range of phenomena from cortical activation patterns to eye 
movement patterns and from memory for static chess positions to memory for 
sequences of moves (including blindfold chess).  Many phenomena identified are 
central to the concerns of psychology, particularly to theories about individual 
differences, memory systems, developmental processes, and theories in cognitive 
science.  The discovery of the strong relation between skilled perception processes 
and skilled problem solving has influenced theory development in many other 
domains.  For instance, chess research has been useful in characterizing the tradeoffs 
seen between memory, perception, and problem solving performance, as well as in 
assessing the role of deliberate practice in maintaining performance across the life 
span (Krampe & Charness, this volume).  Simulation work has proven useful in 
describing how aging processes interact with knowledge processes to predict memory 
performance (Mireles & Charness, 2002). 
 
Nonetheless, many issues remain unresolved.  It is not yet clear how deliberate 
practice and cognitive abilities jointly determine performance across the life span 
given the differing patterns seen in children, young adults, and older adults.  Tighter 
links still need to be drawn between perceptual processes and search processes, 
particularly as a function of skill level.  With the ready availability of modern tools 
(neuro-imaging, eye tracking, simulation) in conjunction with reliable older ones 
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(think-aloud protocol analysis), the future seems bright indeed for expanding our 
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